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THE ANTI-TRUST ACTS AND "MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION"
A Case Study
JULIUS COHEN
One thing is clear. The steady match towards concentrated economic power
has not been stemmed by the anti-trust acts.1 Whether the Sherman Act was
"intended to mean anything save a big noise to gull the gullible"2 or was a
serious attempt to preserve "free competition", it has neither "disintegrated
society into individual atoms' 3 nor eliminated the existence of monopolistic
control. In the judicial laboratory the anti-trust laws have been distilled to
represent mere limitations upon certain competitive tactics.4 The safety zone
carved out by the Standard Oi15 and Tobacco cases,6 the protective cloak
placed around the control manifested by the United States Shoe Machinery
Co. case,7 the sanctioning of price leadership in the steel industry,8 and the
approval of activities of trade associations 9 and joint sales agencies,10 converge
in the observation that monopolistic power in the economic sense has not been
made sterile."
'See generally, BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1937) ; BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) ;, CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL
OF BUSINESS (1926); FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931); KEEZER AND
MAY, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1930); HANDLER (Ed.), FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAWs-A SYmPOSiUm (1932); Handler, Industrial Mergers and Anti-Trust
Laws (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 179; LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY (1931); THORP, RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES (1929); WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL
COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1927).
'Beard, The Trust Problem (September 21, 1938) 96 NEW REPUBLIC 182.
'Justice Holmes' dissent in Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 411,
24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1904).
"McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IowA L. Rxv. 280.
'Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
'United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911).
'United States v. United States Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473
(1918).8United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293
(1920).
'Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578 (1925);
Cement Manufacturers' Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586
(1925).
"United States v. Appalachian Coals, Inc., 288 U. S. 344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933).
'See Wallace, Monopolistic Competition and Public Policy (1936) 26 Am. EcoN. REv.
SuPP. 77, 79. "It seems to me that in so far as there was any central concept or theme
in the interpretation and administration of the anti-trust laws, it was the preservation
of freedom to compete. Obviously this did not mean the preservation of what we now
call pure competition, or even of anything very nearly resembling it. It meant simply
that each firm was to be free to determine its own policies independent of others and
that neither the entry of newcomers nor the success of existing firms should be blocked
or hampered by oppressive tactics. The anti-trust laws did not, I think, make monopoly
illegal. Rather, the thing condemned was monopolism or restraint of trade, both o1
which seem to have meant achieving or trying to attain nearly complete monopoly in an
industry by a course of combination for which no justification in greater efficiency or
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The problem confronting those who desire a realistic reform of the anti-
trust laws has been no more succinctly stated than by the Attorney-General:
"We should consider whether we are chiefly concerned with the form
of competitive practices, or whether the accent is to be placed on the
control of the supply and price of the product, with the resulting mas-
tery of the market."' 2
Implicit in this statement is a recognition of the disparity between the legal
and economic theories of monopoly. Also implicit is the observation that
the laws should be revamped to permit a spotlight on the field of market
economics-not on the tortuous chambers of "intent". The thought is not
new. Students in the field of economics have for some time re-examined, and
re-appraised the concept of monopoly.' 8 Indeed, -its reaction is already being
felt in legal literature.14
If "control of the market" is now to be the diagnostic tool for revamping
anti-trust policy, it might be well to point out the possibility of such control
even in the absence of the usual symptoms-predatory practices and open
agreements in "restraint of trade". To take a simple exaggerated example,
let us suppose that X has control of all the milk in the United States, foreign
competition having been entirely eliminated. Even to the lay mind, this
would be a case of monopoly, because of the control of price through the
control of supply. But suppose that the market is divided between X and Y,
X having 55 per cent and Y 45 per cent of the milk. The mere presence of
another single strong competitor does not necessarily destroy the monopolistic
element. X and Y are aware of each other's productive capacity and power.
If a point is reached wherein no drop in price will increase the demand, X
will normally realize that if he reduces the price of milk, Y will also. This
normal expansion could be found; or by destruction or weakening of existing competitors
or blocking of potential competition by the use of bludgeoning, harassing, or obstructive
tactics rather than competitive methods which measured relative efficiency in production
and marketing."
"Cummings, The Unsolved Problem of Monopoly (1938) 72 U. S. LAv REv. 23.
'See, generally, CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1936);
PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFAP (1929); ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPER-
PEcT COMPETITION (1933); Galbraith, Monopoly and Price Rigidities (1936) 50 Q. J.
EcoN. 456; Harrod, Doctrines of Imperfect Competition (1934) 48 Q. J. EcoN. 442;
Nichol, A Re-Appraisal of Cournot's Theory of Duopoly Price (1934) 42 Q. J. EcoN.
80; A Review of Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition Theories (1936) 26 AM.
EcoN. REv. 637; Robinson, Imperfect Competition and Falling Supply Price (1932) 42
EcON. JoURN. 554; Round Table on Imperfect Competition (March, 1934) AM. ECON.
REv. Supp. 21; Shove, The Imperfection of the Market (March, 1933) 43 ECON.
JOURN. 114; Stackelberg on Monopolistic Competition (1936) 44 J. POL. EcoN. 554;
Sraffa, The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions (Nov., 1926) 36 ECON.
JouRN. 535; Wallace, Monopolistic Competition and Public Policy (1936) 26 AM. EcoN.
REv. Supp. 77.
'A particularly acute examination of the role of market economics is an article by
Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trust Laws, Economic Theories and the Sugar Institute
Decisions (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1339. See also Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics
(1937) 47 YALE L. J. 34.
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awareness restrains him from price-cutting, the result being a "monopolistic
price". Increase the number of sellers in the market to a point at which the
supply of a single seller does not influence the market, and the tendency
becomes one in which monopolistic control shifts into a state of more perfect
competition.15
The terms "duopoly" and "oligopoly" have been used to describe this.
phenomenon when two and more than two competitors respectively maintain
a monopolistic price resulting from their size and the awareness of their
competitive positions. 16 Both terms, however, are expressive of what Mrs.
Robinson has chosen to call "imperfect competition"'17 and Professor Chamber-
lin, "monopolistic competition"., 8
If price uniformity is brought about by an agreement between competitors
to report future prices to a trade association, other conditions being present,
e.g., limited supply of the commodity, there is a probability that the courts
will restrain the association's activities, deeming price uniformity as evidence
of restraint of trade.' 9 If, however, price uniformity results merely from
"following the leader", 20 i.e., from following the published prices of the
dominant power in an industry, the uniformity escapes legal suspicion. To
the economist, however, there may be no difference in result, both situations
leading to a probable monopolistic price.21
Of course, it may be suggested that an anti-trust policy cannot eradicate
'"The phrase 'perfect competition' is made to cover so many separable ideas, and is
used in so many distinct senses that it has become almost valueless as a means of com-
munication." Robinson, What is Perfect Competition? (1934) 49 Q. J. EcoN. 104. How-
ever, the theory of the neo-classicists in respect to their concept of a competitive eqiui-
librium premises two minimal conditions: (1) The number of firms selling a given
product must be so great that the effect on price of the output of each is negligible;
(2) the output of the sellers must be homogeneous-not differentiated, so that the buyers
have alisolutely no reason for preference. Mrs. Robinson classifies these conditions
under "perfect" competition; Prof. Chamberlin, "pure!' competition.
It is to be noted that with increased competition monopolistic price becomes possible
through extensive advertising. A seller may build a trade-name around his product,
creating a consumer preference by "distinguishing" this product. By this process an
escape is made to a more exclusive plane of competition. See CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLIS-
Tic COMPETITION (1936), ch. IV.
"See ch. III, "Duopoly and Oligopoly," in CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1936).
"RoBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1934).
"'CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1936).
'United States v. American Linseed Oil Co. et al., 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 407
(1923). Here there was a limitation of production because of the restricted supply of
raw materials.
'This practice was sanctioned by the Court in United States v. United States Steel
Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct 293 (1920), and United States v. International
Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 47 Sup. Ct. 748 (1927).
nStackelberg distinguishes three possible situations leading to monopolistic price:
(1) The competitors might assume that each is going to behave like a leader and will
therefore act as a follower; (2) each will expect the other to become a follower, each
becoming a leader; (3) one will act as a follower, expecting the other to be a leader.
Stackelberg on Monopolistic Competition (1936) 42 J. POL. EcoN. 554.
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all elements of monopoly in our economic order, for, to put. it in Justice
Holmes' words, "Every concern monopolizes whatever business it does,...
a single railroad down a narrow valley or through a mountain gorge monop-
olizes all the railroad transportation through that valley or gorge."2 2 But
it is one thing to call attention to the fact that every business has an element
of monopoly and another to point to the possibility of monopolistic conditions
in huge market areas, which seemingly escape the vigil of the anti-trust laws.
II
In order to show concretely the disparity between "monopoly" according
to the anti-trust acts, and "monopoly" in the realm of market economics,
the milk distributing industry is offered as a datum. 22t Its past history and
present status lend themselves to a profitable study. However, knowing full
well that the accuracy of data, particularly statisticai, is charged with heated
controversy and that the selection and analysis of "facts" may be colored by
inarticulate value judgments, 23 the evidence will be regarded as being ten-
tative. Whatever arguments may be presented by those who "quarrel with
the figures", there is common value in analysis--even in the analysis of a
hypothetical case.
The problem of monopoly and competition in the milk industry is by no
means a new one. As early as 1914 there was an attempt to apply the
Sherman Act to a phase of the milk industry. One of the most important
cases was United States v. Whiting.24 Here there was an indictment charging
first, a conspiracy in restraint of trade in milk throughout New England,
and second, a combination to monopolize trade in milk in the same territory.
The defendants demurred to both indictments and the cases were argued on
the demurrers together. The indictment stated that several defendants bought
86 per cent of the milk sold in various districts in Maine, Vermont, New
Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts for shipment to and sale in
Boston and vicinity, and had conferred together and agreed upon uniform
prices to be paid by them during each six months period to the producers
'Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 405, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1904).
"After this had gone to press, thirty-four corporations and sixty-three individuals
were indicted by a federal grand jury in Chicago, charged with violating the anti-trust
laws in the milk and ice cream industries. N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1938, p. 1, col. 2.
""To determine facts scientifically, however, is a long and baffling enterprise, not
only because the facts are so often inaccessible, but because what we ordinarily take for
fact is so often full of illusion. Our expectations and prepossessions make us see things
which do not in fact happen, and without the proper previous reflection we fail to notice
many obvious things which do happen." COHEN, REASON AND NATURE (1932) 78.
See also Cooix, The Possibilities of Social Study as a Science, in EssAYs ON RESEA CH
IN THE SOCIAL SciENcEs (1930-1931) 33: "We cannot describe any particular 'given',
the 'brute raw event' as such, because the moment we attempt a description we necessarily
select from it only certain aspects for consideration; we qualify it by bringing it under
some category or other."21212 Fed. 466 (D. C. Mass. 1914).
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of the milk so purchased. The indictment further alleged that as a result
of this agreement the prices paid to the producers had been lowered. The
court sustained the demurrer to the first indictment, charging conspiracy in
restraint of trade, since "it did not allege facts warranting a finding by the
jury that the restraint was unreasonable". The demurrer to the first count
of the second indictment was overruled since the count alleged facts from
which a jury could have found undue, unreasonably extensive and illegal
combination in restraint of trade. The demurrer to the second count of the
latter indictment charging monopoly was sustained because the facts showed
only an agreement to eliminate competition as to price in buying between
the defendants and not an attempt to dominate or control the markets in
which they sold their milk pursuant to the agreement. It is obvious that
the court in the light of present day cases was wrong, for it is perfectly
possible to have a monopoly of buyers.-5
Further evidence of concentrated control in the milk industry was noted
during the War period. In 1921 a Federal Trade Commission report on
the status of competition in the evaporated and condensed milk market during
the War period disclosed that Borden's produced nearly one-fifth of the total
output; that two companies, Borden's and Nestle's, produced approximately
one-third; that four companies, Borden's, Nestle's, Carnation and Helvetia,
produced over one-half; and that ten companies took care of more than three-
fourths of the total output.2 6 Even though there was a tremendous increase
in the production of canned milk from 1914 to 1919, production remained
in the same hands.
At the end of the War period, one writer summed up the general view-
point as follows:
"In the large cities there has grown up an industry which largely
monopolizes the milk supply and which until lately was powerful enough
to dictate prices and conditions both for producers and consumers."27
Further, he wrote:
"It should not be forgotten, however, that while the much abused
middlemen in times past have been able to dictate terms and prices and
have often abused the privilege, they have at the same time used their
influence and power to improve the milk supply. As the supply of oil
and gasoline has been perfected and cheapened by the all-powerful
Standard Oil Company as a monopoly crushing all competition, so the
'Milk Trust' has improved the distribution of milk and has built up
magnificent sanitary plants in which milk is handled, pasteurized, bot-
The Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A.
2d 1924).
'Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Milk and Milk Products 1914-1918
(Government Printing Office, 1921) 56-58.
'FREDERICKSEN', THE SToRY OF MiLK (1919) 39-40.
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tled and distributed in a way that might not have been possible without
a monopoly. It has served a good purpose, but has at the same time
acquired such power that official control has become necessary for the
protection of producer and consumer alike, and the time may be near
when these two classes will combine and take the matter into their own
hands so that the distribution may be done at actual cost."' '
The Food Administration had, of course, come to an end. The cry of
"business affected with a public interest" was beginning to be heard, as
especially applied to the milk industry.29 The main development towards
integration came from technical processes, new machinery, better business
methods, advertising, sanitation, etc.8 0 Small companies grew into large ones.
Cooperatives were on the rise. The concept of collective bargaining as a
method of fixing prices and quantity of milk handled developed from a theory
to a practice. Tariffs even helped the business to boom.8 1
In 1926 the problem of monopoly in the milk distributing industry again
came to the surface when the United States brought suit against the National
Food Products Corporation. A petition was filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, to prevent and restrain vio-
lations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act through acquisitions of stock in
competing chain groceries and other companies engaged in the transportation
of milk and milk products.8 2 A consent decree was entered March 4, 1926,
granting the relief sought.
In 1934 more attention was brought to the possibility of monopoly in the
milk distributing industry by the adoption of a House Resolution which read
as follows:
"That the Federal Trade Commission is authorized and directed to
investigate the conditions with respect to the sale and distribution of
milk and other dairy products within the territorial limits of the United
States by any person, partnership, association, cooperative or corpora-
tion, with a view to determining particularly whether any such person,
partnership, association, cooperative or corporation is operating within
any milkshed of the United States in such a manner as to substantially
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in the sale and dis-
tribution of such dairy products, or is a party to any conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce within the United States or any part
thereof, or is using any unfair method of competition in connection
with the sale or distribution of any such dairy products, or is in any
way operating to depress the price of milk sold by producers." 8
"Id. at 40-41.
'ERDMAN, THE MARKETING OF WHOLE MILK (1921) 13.
'Ross, Some Factors Affecting the Demand for Milk and Cream in the Metropolitan
Area, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin No. 73 (1928).
3 LININGER, DAIRY PRODUCTS UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADmINIsTRA-
Tno (1934) 6.
'THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRuST LA sV wrrH AMENDMENTS (U. S. Government Printig
Office, 1931) 195.
'This part of the House Concurrent Resolution No. 32, 73d Congress, 2d Session, is
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III
The Federal Trade Commission investigation disclosed the Borden Com-
pany and the National Dairy Products Corporation as the two largest dis-
tributors of milk and milk products in the country. During 1932, findings
of both the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Trade Commission
disclosed that the Borden Company and its subsidiaries purchased 3,479,-
055,735 pounds of milk, representing 10.3 per cent of the total milk sold
in the wholesale market in the United States during the year.
The total wholesale fluid milk sales during 1932 in the states supplying
New York and Philadelphia amounted to 9,656,000,000 pounds. The Borden
Company and its subsidiaries purchased 1,563,181,502 pounds, or 16.2 per
cent of the total. In the Connecticut milkshed the Borden Company purchased
18.67 per cent of the total in 1932. By one of its subsidiaries having com-
bined with the Wieland Dairy Company of Chicago, in June, 1933, the
Borden-Wielant Company distributed 21 per cent of the total milk sold in
the Chicago sales area. During 1935 Borden's Farm Products, Inc., sold
385,035,529 quarts of fluid milk in New York metropolitan area. This was
equivalent to 30.1 per cent of the estimated total.
To convey a sense of size, one: might point out that when Gail Borden
first organized the company, the authorized capital stock was $20,000,000.
By 1927, the authorized capital stock was $50,000,000. From 1930 on to
1935 there were additions of $8,000,000 for each respective year. During
the years 1928-31 the company issued approximately 2,000,000 shares of
its capital stock directly applying to the acquisition of either stock or assets
of 124 companies. The business of the Borden Company was originally
confined to the manufacture and sale of condensed milk. It has expanded,
however, from time to time and now includes in its lists of products manu-
factured and sold, condensed milk, evaporated milk, dried milk, malted milk,
cheese of all kinds, fluid milk, cream, ice cream, butter, and many other milk
products. At the end of 1927 the Borden Company owned and operated
three fluid distributing companies, and seven manufacturing and selling
companies. There were also twenty-five parent subsidiaries operating under
the parent company at the end of 1927. Beginning with 1928 the Borden
Company initiated and pursued a policy of expansion, in.which a large
number of companies were acquired. From 1928 to 1932 the company ac-
quired, either directly or indirectly through its subsidiaries, approximately
two hundred companies engaged in some branch of the dairy industry, in-
cluding fluid milk, cream, ice cream, butter, cheese and other dairy products.3 4
contained in Summary Report of Conditions zoith Respect to the Sale and Distribution
of Milk and Dairy Products (1937) H. R. Doc. No..94, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-2.
'Report of the Federal Trade Commission on' the Sale and Distribution of Milk and
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Investigation further revealed the National Dairy Products Corporation
as strictly a holding company, owning stocks of subsidiaries engaged in prac-
tically every branch of the dairy industry.3 5 During 1934 this corporation and
its subsidiaries purchased 7,177,041,000 quarts of milk, which was equal to
9.4 per cent of the total commercial milk produced in the United States in
that year. This corporation was built up through acquisition and consolidation
of milk and dairy products companies. As a part of its original organization
it acquired the Hydrox Corporation, operating ice-cream plants in Chicago
and vicinity, and the Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Company, operating in western
Pennsylvania and northeastern Ohio. in addition to acquiring capital stock,
it has acquired the assets of outstanding dairy, cheese, and ice cream com-
panies, to be turned over immediately to newly formed subsidiaries. Among
the more important acquisitions by the corporation since its organization in
1923 were Sheffield Farms, Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, General Ice
Cream Corporation, and Breyer Ice Cream Company, including their sub-
sidiaries and related interests. The acquisition of assets of the Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corporation carried with it control of about fifty separate corporate
entities, the capital stock of which was purchased as a part of the assets of
the Kraft Company. About forty separate corporations were acquired directly
through the acquisition of the General Ice Cream Corporation. In 1934 the
purchases of the National Dairy Products Corporation were equivalent to
19.1 per cent of all the milk sold at wholesale by producers in Vermont,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. These figures do
not include purchases by the Rieck Company, or by the Breyer Ice Cream
Company. Sheffield Farms Company, acquired in 1934, purchased from
producers in 1934 in New York State alone, 1,031,198,995 pounds of milk,
equivalent to 18.9 per cent of all milk sold at wholesale by producers in the
state except that retailed by farmers. Supplee-Wills Jones Milk Company is
the largest in the Philadelphia area; General Ice Cream Corporation operates
New Haven Dairies in Connecticut and R. G. Miller and Sons distributes
milk in Hartford. National Dairy during June, 1934, handled 39.3 per cent
of the total milk sold in Hartford, 30.5 per cent of the milk sold in New
Haven, and 14.7 per cent of the total milk sold in the State of Connecticut.
It also holds the unique position of distributing approximately 55 per cent
of all the fluid milk in the Baltimore area. The acquisition of Breakstone
Bros., Inc. and of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation gave National Dairy ap-
proximately one-third of the cheese business of the United States. C. A.
Straubel, a subsidiary of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, is one of the few.
Milk Products in the New York Area (1937) H. R. Doc. No. 95, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 p.
56-62.
'For the history and organization of the National Dairy Products Corporation, see
id. at 77-91.
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active members of the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange at Plymouth, Wisconsin,
whose activities fix the basis for the price of cheese throughout the United
States. During 1934 this corporation through its subsidiaries manufactured ice
cream equal to 21.38 per cent of the total quantity of ice cream manufactured
for sale in the United States. In 1932 the total business of its ice cream sub-
sidiaries ranged from 2 per cent in Montana to more than 52 per cent in
Connecticut. 6
IV
What is the relationship between the concentration of the business of milk
distribution and the market?37 Evidence points to three criteria:
A. Price Leadership
In the New York metropolitan area, the Attorney General's Report of
March, 1938, points out that "in the retail trade . . . competition for all
intents and purposes is practically non-existent . . ." and that "announce-
ments of price increase have invariably been made simultaneously, and the
trade discounts and rebates which accompany competition in the wholesale
trade are not present", s s It was found that the existence of "peddlers",
'Summary Report of Conditions with Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk
and Dairy Products (1937) H. R. Doc. No. 94, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1.
'It is assumed, of course, that there have been no agreements of the type condemned
by the anti-trust acts.
@"REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE MILK INDUSTRY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (March 8, 1938) 16. This will be subsequently referred to as the "Attorney Gen-
eral's Report."
See for instance New York Times, Sept. 4, 1936, p. 1, col. 5, indicating a simultaneous
increase of one cent per quart of milk announced by Borden and Sheffield; "while the
meetings were held simultaneously, there was no connection in the conclusions reached
by the separate companies, officials indicated." For similar instances of price uniformity
see New York Times, Sept. 10, 1936, p. 24, col. 7; July 1, 1937, p. 29, col 8; Aug. 24,
1937, p. 23, col. 1.
It is interesting to note in the following table contained in the ATTORNEY GENERAI'S
REPORT, 91, that substantial price uniformity existed even after the era of state milk
control.
RETAIL PRIcES AT DOOR-GRADE "B" MILK QUARTS
1937
Oct. 1
Distri- Aug. Aug. 25 Nov. Nov.
butors March April May June July 1-24 Sept. 30 1-6 7-30 Dec.
P 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14
A 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
R 10.8 10.2 9.8 10.8 10.9 11.8 11.8 12.5
M 13-12 12-11 12-11 .12-11 12 13 13 13 14 14
B B 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
C C 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
E 3 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
D 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
B 1 13 12 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
B 2 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
F 2 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
G 13 11.4 10.6 10.8 11.78 11.77 12.72 12.68 13.7 13.3
S 13 12-11 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
D D 12 11 10 10 10.5 11 11 12 12.5
F 1 13 12 . 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14
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whose price-cutting had been one of the prime reasons for passing the New
York Milk Control Act of 1933, did not have sufficient control of the supply
to affect the retail market ;39 and that the retail prices increased or decreased
with the prices announced by only two or three of the distributing companies,
particularly Borden and Sheffield, who controlled 76 per cent of the retail
trade in the metropolitan area in 1936.40 Surprisingly enough, the retail
prices set by the advertised brands of the leaders were even followed by the
non-advertised brands. In the wholesale field, however, price uniformity
was noticed only as between the advertised brands,4' the non-advertised brands
being subjected to "severe and cut-throat competition". 42
B. Profits
Professor Spencer reported that in 1927 the profits of Borden, National,
Beatrice, Golden State, and Western Dairy Products were at a somewhat
higher rate than those of 1400 manufacturing and trading corporations for
which the data were compiled by the National City Bank. In 1931 when
deflation was well under way, the profits of the dairy corporations fell off
very little, while those of the manufacturing and trading corporations had a
net deficit for the year. In 1933, the profits of the dairy corporations showed
a further moderate decline to about 4.2 per cent of the net worth. On the
other hand, profits of the manufacturing and trading corporations recovered
from a deficit to a profit of 2.7 per cent of the investment.43
"In general, we might conclude that the large dairy companies were
making very satisfactory profits for some years previous to the depres-
sion, and that their profits were maintained during the early stages of
the depression much better than those of most industrial enterprises.
We would expect this because the dairy companies are supplying -the
public with necessary foods, the purchase of which is curtailed only
under extreme necessity. It is probable too that the dairy industry is
organized in such a way that it has been better able to resist the down-
ward trend in retail prices."44 .
An audit made by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration revealed
that from 1928 to 1933 the net profits of the distributors in the Philadelphia
milkshed were 30.76 per cent; in Boston, 22.45 per cent; in St. Louis, 14.64
per cent; and in Chicago, 25.84 per cent. During this same period it was shown
that the wholesale price of milk sold by farmers declined 50 per cent, result-
'ATToRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 38, at 17.
"Id. at 18.
"Id. at 18.
,OId. at 15.
'Spencer, The Spread Between Farin and Retail Prices for Milk (1935) AMERICAN
COOPERATION 491.
"Ibid. (italics supplied).
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ing in severe hardships and suffering to milk producers throughout the United
States and causing violence throughout many sections of the country.45
In the New York area, Professor Spencer reported:
"From 1929 to 1932 the retail price of milk in New York city dropped
from sixteen cents a quart to twelve cents, or 25 per cent. The dealer's
spread on retail milk during the same period was reduced one-half cent
per quart, or about 6 per cent. Although the entire weight of the
deflation fell upon the farmer, whose class I price was reduced three
and one-half cents per quart, or nearly fifty per cent. .... -46
In the Philadelphia milkshed it was reported there was a four cent per
quart drop in the price of milk between December, 1930, and January, 1933.4
Of this four cents, the farmer was obliged to absorb 3.3 cents and the
distributor, .7 cent. A view was sponsored that the dealer's margins are to
be regarded in normal times, at least, as fixed and unalterable charges. At
a federal hearing held in Boston, December, 1933, Joseph A. Willman, Sr.,
of the Whiting Milk Company maintained that the price problem was no
concern of the distributors but that it was rather an issue between the pro-
ducers and consumers themselves.48
More recently, the Attorney General's Report on the milk industry for
the New York metropolitan area reveals that "the profit on milk sold at the
door at the established prices and at the store prices is substantial. . . . at
the present prices, the percentages of profit on sales are as follows: grade B
milk at retail 13 per cent; advertised brands of grade B milk at wholesale
16 per cent; grade A milk at retail 21 per cent; and grade A-vitamin D milk
at retail 27 per cent. ' 49 This, of course, does not take into consideration
the profits made by the same companies on the sale of milk products manu-
factured from surplus milk, which, because of their interrelation, cannot be
divorced from an analysis of the problem. 0 For instance, of the ten exam-
ined companies which were exclusively engaged in the manufacture of milk
'Supra note 36, p. 1.
"Supra note 43, p. 489.
"The farmer [as distinguished from the distributor], on the other hand, has no one
to whom he may pass on a reduction of price." ATTORNEY GENERAs'S REPORT, p. 54.
A study in forty cities in the central and north central states revealed that from 1929
to 1933, the percentage of price decline suffered by the farmers was greater than
the percentage of reductions suffered by the distributors: " . . . In 1931, 1932,
and 1933 prices paid to farmers for milk declined with considerable rapidity. During
this last three year period, distributors' margins per quart dropped somewhat, but not
by anything like the same percentage as did prices to farmers. . . " Mortensen, Distribu-
tion of Milk under' Public Utility Regulatio ' (1936) 26 Am. EcoN. REv. 23.
'
7Harris, Battle of the Milksheds (Nov. 1933) CURRENT HISTORY 197.
'
8 CASSELS, A STUDY OF MMK PRICES (1937) 118.
"'ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 98.
'As will be seen later, infra note 66, it is the large companies with manufacturing
affiliates which benefit greatly from the purchase of "surplus" milk, supposedly used for
the production of manufactured products. Unfortunately, the Attorney General's Report
did not examine the incidents of this relationship.
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products, 'the Attorney General reported one to have made 108.66 per cent
profit on net tangible assets in 1936, with the high probability of repetition
in 1937.51
The two major distributors seem to have taken issue with the charge of
"substantial profits". In December, 1937, the Borden Farm Products Divi-
sion of the Borden Company issued a statement to the press indicating that
for the six months ending September 30, 1937, they lost 1.02 cents for every
dollar spent for Borden's milk. Sheffield Farms Company, a subsidiary of
National Dairy Products Corporation, reported that for the year 1936 its
profit averaged less than Yg of 1 per cent "on all milk handled". 52 The
Attorney General's Report, however, attempts to show that when analyzed
the press statements of the two concerns may be misleading. The Sheffield
statement, for example, is based upon "all milk handled". But part of the
milk "handled" included 111,000,000 quarts to affiliated companies in 1936,
and 63,000,000 quarts in 1937, sold at an average price of 3.5 cents per
quart. This shows a "loss" to the Sheffield Farms Company, but it must be
borne in mind that another affiliate of the National Dairy Company profited
correspondingly.5 3 Likewise, the Report suggests that the Borden statement
has not been broken down to show the intercompany transactions and the
transmission of profits to the affiliates. 54
The Attorney General's Report further suggests that it is safe to assume
that both the Borden and Sheffield statements are based upon "milk equiva-
lent" and not milk or milk products taken separately.55 That "milk equivalent"
is an improper basis for estimating profit on fluid milk is readily appreciated.56
mATToRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 116.
'ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 99.
'Note, for instance, the profit of 68 per cent on the net tangible assets after payment
of taxes in 1936 on the part of the Sheffield Condensed Milk Company, to whom the
Sheffield Farms Company sold milk below the market price. Id. at 100.
"Id. at 101.
"Id. at 106.
"'"For the purpose of computing this 'milk equivalent', all milk, cream and milk
products are reduced to a common denominator. The common denominator is butter fat
content. On the basis of butter fat content, a quart of milk with a butter fat content of
3.6% would not be comparable to a quart of cream containing 36% butter fat. If the
butter fat content is used as a common denominator, the quart of cream with 36% of
butter fat is considered to be the equivalent of ten quarts of milk. Thus one quart of
milk and one quart of cream would be computed as eleven quarts of 'milk equivalent'.
If the return received from a quart of milk were 14 cents and the return received from
the quart of cream was 76'/ cents, 32 cent of which would be the return from the skim
milk resulting from separation, the total return would be 903/2 cents, but the total return
per quart of 'milk equivalent' would be 8 2/11 cents (eleven quarts of milk equivalent
divided into 903/2 cents, the total return). Some comparable methods are used to com-
pute the 'milk equivalent' of cheese, condensed milk, ice cream, and other manufactured
milk products. The 'milk equivalent' basis renders it impossible to determine the return
on different grades of milk, and the conclusions drawn from the experience of 'milk
equivalent' are completely unenlightening. It must be remembered that the interest of
the public lies not in so-called luxury products but in milk alone. If the profit in milk
is exorbitant that should not be nullified by the fact that the profit on other items
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The Ernst and Ernst audit of fourteen distributing companies, including the
affiliates of both Borden and Sheffield, as well as three independent companies
and the Dairymen's League, revealed that for the year ending December 31,
1936, there was an average profit of 11.06 per cent made on net tangible
assets and $.00464 per quart of milk. For the first nine months of 1937, the
profit on assets was 5.11 per cent and the profit per quart was $.0028.17
The audit further revealed that the average gross spread on milk, represent-
ing the difference between what the farmer and the distributor received, was
"about" 5.5 cents.58 Compared to the findings of the Attorney General, profits
in milk distribution seem exceedingly small.59 However, it has been pointed
out in criticism of the audit that the findings do not take into consideration
the difference in profits between milk and milk products6 0-that the results
are based not on a quart of A milk or a quart of B milk, but a hypothetical
quart of milk called "milk equivalent", which is a composite of milk, cream,
butter, cheese, ice cream, etc. 61 The entire question of the dealer's spread
in the purchase and sale of fluid milk alone is so inextricably intertwined
with the handling of surplus milk, that it has been deemed to be practically
impossible to reach any satisfactory conclusion as a result of the audit.62
C. Advantage over Producers and Consumers
Under the normal scheme of things, the price that the farmer gets for his
milk depends usually on what the distributor can do with it. If the farmer
presents the distributor with 100 gallons of milk, and the distributor bottles
it and sells it to consumers, the farmer usually gets the highest price for it,
known as class I price. If only fifty gallons are sold for immediate consump-
tion purposes, the farmer will receive class I prices only for the fifty gallons,
and if the distributor can sell all of the cream in the other fifty gallons of
milk after he separates it, the farmer will receive a class II, or lower price
for the fifty gallons. If the distributor can only sell the cream in ten gallons
of milk, the farmer will receive the class II price for the ten gallons and a
class III price for the forty gallons, which may be used for the manufacture
of butter. Or it still may be broken down to class IV purposes for ice cream
because of widespread competition is considerably lower." ATToRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT,
104.
'Report of Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets Regarding the Audit of Milk
Dealers and Cooperative Associations, N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1938) No. 100, p. 5. This will
hereafter be cited as the "Ernst and Ernst Report."
wIbid.
'The Attorney General reported that from November, 1937 to January 15, 1938,
there was a profit of 1A cents per quart of B milk in December, 1937, a profit of 2.8
cents per quart of grade A milk and a profit of 3.7 cents per quart of Grade A Vitamin
D milk, all sold at retail. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 98.
'Letter of Holton V. Noyes, New York Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets,
in Ernst and Ernst Report, supra note 57, at 11.
'See statement of Commissioner Noyes in New York Times, Feb. 8, 1938, p. 1, col. 6.
'Ibid.
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or cheese, in which the price of the milk sold is still lower. To repeat, this
is in a normal market, without any governmental regulation. Suppose the
distributor has .the upper hand? Who is to determine whether the milk sold
to the distributor actually goes into class I, II, III, or IV use? Who knows
how much of class III or IV milk the distributor uses for class I purposes?
Producers of milk have not always been fortified adequately with this in-
formation."- Two distributors, during 1932 and the first six months of 1933,
paid surplus milk prices for 2,392,369 quarts of milk which they had sold
in bottles.64 One large St. Louis distributor put cream made from milk paid
for at class III prices into storage during May, June and August, 1935. Some
of this cream was taken out of storage during October, 1935 and January,
1936, and was reported used for class II sales.65 Huge corporations with sub-
sidiaries in all of the principal lines of products in the industry and with coun-
try receiving plants as well as manufacturing plants and processing plants are
in strategic positions for the purchase of milk. Subsidiaries located in areas
where production is high and prices low may purchase milk, transfer and
ship to subsidiaries in areas where production is low, milk scarce and prices
high. These corporations take advantage of the interstate character of the
milk industry, and in order to gain price ends can threaten the producer
by buying elsewhere if the price is not satisfactory. Thus size, geographic
position, and financial power have left the producer subject to the whip of
the large distributors.6
When New York State attempted through its Milk Control Law to stem
this practice by equalizing the price of milk coming into the state from foreign
channels, the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. G. A. Seelig, Inc.,6(7 declared the
'In New York, there has been no check upon the disposition of the milk sold by the
Dairymen's League to the Borden Company. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 38. The
same is true in respect to the relation between the Sheffield Producers Cooperative Asso-
ciation and the Sheffield Farms Company. Id. at 43.
'Sinnmary Report of Conditions with Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and
Dairy Products (1937) H. R. Doc. No. 94, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4.
'Supra note 64, p. 5.
""The corporation is in a position to take advantage of the interstate character of the
milk industry and thus defeat the efforts of State control boards to maintain fixed prices
to producers within the State by importing milk from other States where fixed prices
are lower or where there is no price control. With its large capital and vast facilities
for assembling, processing, and storing milk and cream, the corporation can purchase
milk in flush seasons when it is plentiful and prices low and store it for use in the
manufacture of many dairy products in low-production season when milk is scarce and
prices high." Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distribution of
Milk and Milk Products in the New York Milk Area, (1937) H. R. Doc. No. 95, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess.,.87. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 46.
7294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935). One of the devices used to temper the effects
of Baldwin v. Seelig is the marketing agreement which the Secretary of Agriculture
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act has been empowered to promulgate, provided
the concurrence of a designated percentage of the producers and handlers is obtained.
See 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 608-b, 608-c (1), (2), (5), (8), (18). As yet, the validity of
these sections has not been tested by the Supreme Court. However, in the lower federal
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regulation invalid, thus reinforcing what had already been the practice of
the larger distributors.
In New York, the Rogers-Allen Act 8 of May 19, 1937, inaugurated a
newer technique in the regulation of milk marketing. Instead of an admin-
istrative commission regulating minimum and maximum prices, the plan
provides for the organization of producers and distributors into "bargaining
agencies" for the purpose of making marketing agreements with each other
for the sale of milk in metropolitan areas. An agreement between the pro-
ducer's and the distributor's bargaining groups must be approved by the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets. If, subsequent to his approval,
75 per cent or more of the producers also approve, the Commissioner may
issue an order making the terms of the agreement effective. When, however,
35 per cent or more of the producers oppose it, it must be rescinded. There
is an express provision in the Act exempting the bargaining agencies from
the provisions of the state Anti-Trust Act. This technique follows the theory
of such projects as the NRA codes, Agricultural Adjustment Act, and more
recently, the Guffey-Vinson Coal Act, in which industry is given permission,
through organization and agreement, to solve many of its own tangled
problems.
Already, the charge of domination has been made against the producers'
bargaining agency, known as the Metropolitan Milk Producer's Bargaining
Agency. The Attorney General's. Report suggests,
"There can be no question but that both the Dairymen's League and
Sheffield Producers Cooperative Association, Inc., if and when acting
in concert, can control the Metropolitan Milk Producers Bargaining
Agency. '6
The membership of the distributors' bargaining group, known as the New
York Metropolitan Milk Distributors' Bargaining Agency, is limited to milk
dealers who deliver milk to stores or consumers in the metropolitan area.
The Attorney General's Report indicates that the members of this agency sell
in excess of 85 per cent of all the milk sold in the metropolitan area, and
courts, difficulties seem to be encountered on two issues, (1) whether such agreements
constitute a regulation of intrastate commerce and (2) granted interstate commerce,
whether there is an unwarranted regulation of production. On the first point see Berdie
v. Kurtz, 75 F. (2d) 898 (1935) ; Darger v. Hill, 76 F. (2d) 198 (1935) ; Royal Farms
Dairy v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 975 (1934) ; and United States v. Shissler, 7 F. Supp.
123 (1934). On the second point see United States v. David Buttrick Co., 91 F. (2d)
66 (1937) ; United States v. Seven Oaks Dairy Co., 10 F. Supp. 995 (1935) ; Columbus
Milk Producers' Co-operative Association v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 1014 (1934); and
Edgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (1934). See also note, Milk Regula-
tion in New York (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1364 and ToBEY, FEDERAL AND STATE CONTROL
OF MILK PRICES (1937) 1-10.
"9Laws 1937, c. 383; AGRICULTURE AND MARKETs LA w §§ 258-k, 258-I, 258-m, 258-n.
"ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, 54.
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that the combined "volume vote" of Sheffield and Borden would be in excess
of 66313 per cent.70It would normally be assumed that the producers, now organized, would
reap much benefit in a. rising market, and that in a declining market the
advantage would be with the organized distributors. The Attorney General's
Report has pointed out, however, that when the market is the "producer's
market", the distributors are not necessarily adversely affected. For example,
when there was an increase in the price given to the producers from July to
December, 1937, the distributors merely passed the increase on to the con-
sumers in the form of higher prices."'
Often the distributors found themselves able not only to pass on the in-
creased cost of milk to the consumer, but to make a substantial profit above
the increase. For instance, it was reported that from June 30, 1937, to
December 2, 1937, the class I milk price paid to the producers was increased
to a total of 98 cents per hundredweight, while the price to consumers was
simultaneously increased by the distributors to a total of $1.41 per hundred-
weight.72 Of course, this can be explained only by the fact that the consumers
are not effectively organized to resist price advances,73 and that the demand
for milk, despite small fluctuations, is relatively inelastic.
74
V
If monopolistic competition as a result of the size of the leaders in the
milk distributing industry is manifested by such characteristics as uniformity
of price through "price leadership", buoyancy of profits, power to maintain
the upper hand in the bargaining process be it with the producer or con-
sumer, wherein does such power elude the meshwork of the Anti-Trust Acts?
In the main, the dominating size of both the Borden and the National Dairy
has been reached by the acquisition of non-competing -concerns. Two tech-
niques chiefly have been used, one, the complementary type of merger, and
the second, the chain store type.75 At the time the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission were under discussion, the complementary type
of merger was little known. Since its aim is to bring together non-competing
"Id. at 56.
'ATTORNEY GENERAi's REPORT, 53.T2See a statement to this effect by Commissioner Noyes in New York Times, Dec. 2
1937, p. 2, col. 2. New York Times, Nov. 7, 1937, p. 19, col. 1, contains a similai
statement by Mayor LaGuardia: "This increase is not justified. A breakdown of figures
indicates that the distributors are paying farmers 28 cents additional while their chaige
to the consumer is 47 cents for forty-seven quarts."
"An exception is the recent Milk Consumers' Protective League of New York which
is making a serious attempt to make the consumer conscious of his power.
"Cassels, The Fluid Milk Program of the Agricultural Adjustment Administratiops(1936) 43 J. OF POL. EcoN. 486.
n'TPPETs AND LvERmoRE, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL (1932) 465.
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companies, a merger of this sort is not subject to prosecution for restraint
of trade. The theory under which it operates is that products sold to the
same group or general class of consumers can be profitably handled together.
A current example is that of the General Foods Corporation. 7 6 The National
Dairy Products Corporation and the Borden Company operate somewhat
in the same manner. Their list of products now includes condensed milk,
dried milk, malted milk, cheese of all kinds, fluid milk, cream, ice cream,
butter, mayonnaise, and other milk products."
The chain type of merger has been described as an "addition of units"
rather than a real merger.78 The difference is really one of degree, dependent
upon the intensity and extensity of the acquisitions. The fact that such units
are open to competition from other local concerns frees this type of "merger"
from the danger of anti-trust prosecution, just as the typical complementary
type of merger is immune from attack.79 *This plan, in the main, sponsors
non-competing units engaged in making and selling exactly the same product,
and joined under one control. A brief examination of the acquisitions of both
the National Dairy Products Corporation and the Borden Company will
reveal an expansion along this line, having built a group of dairy and dairy
products companies operating, in the main, in non-competing territories, and
still subject to local competition."0
To the extent that the National Dairy Products Corporation and the Borden
Company integrate the process of manufacturing milk products they have
followed the vertical scheme of mergers, perhaps one of the most successful
of which is the Ford Company.
Both organizations as yet have avoided the pitfalls of the horizontal merger
7'This organization controls such an array of products as Postum, Jello, Swansdowns
-Cake Flour, Minute Tapioca, Walter Baker Chocolate, Franklin Baker Cocoanut
Products, Log Cabin Syrup, Maxwell House Coffee, Calumet Baking Powder, Certo,
Richard Hellman Salad Dressing, La France Starch, and Diamond Salt.
'A list of commodities handled by both companies may be found in the Report of the
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 66, pp. 120-137.
"Supra note 75.
"In United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, 447 (1920),
the Court emphasized the fact that there could be no monopoly if there was competition
after the merger.
'The "chain-store" type of expansion of both Borden and National Dairy is revealed
in the Report of the Federal Trade Commission, sipra note 66, pp. 120-136. According
to the report, it would seem that the greatest control of any single distributor in a single
market is in the Baltimore area, in which a subsidiary of the National Dairy Nvas reported
to have 55 'per cent of the distribution of fluid milk to its credit. Summary Report of
Conditions with Respect to the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Products (1937)
H. R. Doc. No. 94, 75 Cong., 1st Sess., 15. There seems to be no evidence available as
to whether this control was obtained through merger.
Other examples of this type of "merger" are the Sears and Ward chains; the Macy
umits in New York, Newark, Columbus and Atlanta; the National Department Stores;
and McKesson and Robbins, the latter constituting a combination of wholesale drug
.concerns in non-competing areas, in order to compete more adequately with such chains
.s Liggetts.
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which thus far has been most vulnerable to anti-trust attacks.81 This type
of merger constitutes the simple consolidation of companies making the same
product, located at the same stage in a given industrial process. It was
originally conceived as the control of a strategic point in such a process, so
located that the raw material or supply producers on one hand and the con-
sumers on the other would both pay tribute to the successful merger of this
type. One of the best examples has been that of the old American Sugar
Refining Company.
Further evidence of the inability of the Anti-Trust Acts to limit the size
of the distributors is revealed by a commentary on Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, made by the Federal Trade Commission.82 The Commission recently
reported its inability, under this section, to restrain the acquisition of assets
of competitors. This inability is the result of Supreme Court holdings to
the effect that where the assets have been acquired before the Commission
filed its complaint, the order cannot require their disposition, even though
the assets were acquired as a result of an illegal transaction. 83 That Section 7
was intended to apply only to the acquisitions of stock is indicated by the
fact that several amendments were introduced in Congress which would have
made the section applicable to other methods of control and all the amend-
ments were rejected by Congress.8 4 The courts have not been sympathetic
towards this section. They have held that the two companies which were
combined must have been in substantial competition with each other, that
such competition is substantially lessened by the acquisition of stock, that
competition in the industry at large is restrained, and that there is a tendency
towards a monopoly 8 5 In the face of the complementary and chain-store
types of merger utilized by the National Dairy Products and the Borden
Company, it would seem that Section 7 would be quite impotent.
To add to the aforesaid analysis, the additional difficulty presented by the
problem of interstate commerce would indeed further complicate the effective-
ness of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Despite the fact that both the Borden
Company and the National Dairy Products Company operate in many states,
it is arguable that a good share of their business, e.g., purchase and distribu-
'eUnited States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911);
United States v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502
(1911) ; United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 522 (W. D. N. Y. 1915). For
a general summary, see McLAuGHLIN, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1933)
214 et seq., n. 51.
*'Supra note 64, p. 37.
'Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company, 272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct.
175, 71 L. ed. 405 (1926) ; Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Company v. Federal Trade
Commission, 291 U. S. 587, 54 Sup. Ct. 532, 78 L. ed. 1007 (1934).
"lrvine, The Uncertainties of Section 7 of the Clayton Act (1928) 14 CORNELL L. Q.
28, 35.
'Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 179,
264.
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tion of milk, is purely intrastate, and therefore without the pale of these
Acts. How much is intrastate is a matter of evidence, not within the purview
of this paper. However, as a matter of observation, the mere operation of
many units in many states is not per se an interstate process. It is question-
able, even in the light of the NLRB cases,8 6 whether the mere effect upon the
interstate, market of the practices of the large dealers would permit sub-
sumption under the interstat commerce powers of Congress.
Even if competing distributors combine in order to maintain a united
bargaining front as against the producers, a plan which in essence is spon-
sored by the Rogers-Allen Act in New York, it is doubtful whether the
Sherman Act would be any more operative. In the Appalachian Coals case,8 7
the Supreme Court took pains to point out that even though there is an
agreement among producers to cooperate in the joint sale of coal, there is
no monopoly in the Sherman Act sense because the "developed and potential
capacity of other producers will afford effective competition". Using this
argument, the larger distributors can show one source of potential competition
in the small distributors, often called "peddlers", who swarm into the com-
petitive market during periods of overproduction. This is what happened in
New York State and finally led the state to sponsor milk control regulation
through administrative tribunals. The Pitcher Committee report described a
situation in which the small distributors were able to buy milk for fluid
purposes at class III prices, and that the big distributors were not flexible
enough to avoid the evils of the surplus market with the same degree of
success. The large distributors had to pay fluid milk prices for some milk,
and surplus milk prices for others. The small distributors were flexible
enough to purchase only at surplus prices, and to undersell the larger com-
petitors88 It was comparatively inexpensive to venture into the distributive
market. A delivery wagon, or truck, and a few friends constituting a route
was all that was necessary. The overhead was small, the cost low. This
'National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct.
615 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Co., 301 U. S.
58, 57'Sup. Ct. 645 (1937) ; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 58 Sup. Ct. 656 (1938).
61288 U. S. 344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933).
"'Report of the Jobit Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry, LEG.
Doc. (1933) No. 114, p. 16:
"The fact that the larger distributors find it necessary to carry large quantities of
surplus milk while smaller distributors do not, leads to price cutting and other forms
of destructive competition, especially when the surplus is abnormally large. The small
distributors can contract for minimum requirements and depend -upon emergency pur-
chases when threatened with a shortage. The large distributors cannot do this, since the
same percentage deficiency in volume would involve quantities too great to be obtained
on short notice. The result of the situation is that the smaller distributors who take
no responsibility for the surplus by purchasing their milk on the basis of the blended
prices paid by the larger organizations, are in a position to undersell the larger distribu-
tors in the cities."
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same condition precipitated the marketing agreements under the Agriculture
Adjustment Act.8 9 From 1930 to 1933 there was a very wide spread be-
tween fluid and surplus milk prices, and with a huge oversupply small dealers
grew up overnight.90 These "peddlers" usually arise during hard times, when
people are satisfied with meagre profits. The marketing agreements in 1933
were attempts to stabilize milk production so that the evils resulting from
surplus milk, i.e., price depreciation and the influx of small dealers, could
be checked. Even under the marketing agreements, the larger distributors
have expressed some concern over the fact that the act does not openly
sponsor the control of resale prices, unless such control is manifested in the
marketing agreements themselves. On one occasion milk distributors refused
to sign the marketing agreements that would bind them to pay fixed prices
to producers without protecting them from price-cutting from competitors. 91
The competitors in this case most likely consisted in the smaller distributors
who were content with a smaller margin of profit.
A second potential threat to the position of the distributors in the milk
industry lies in the creation of producer-distributor cooperatives, i.e., organi-
zations of farmers who unite not only to pool their production, but also to
distribute and market the product, thereby eliminating the middleman. It is
a real threat, for the producers can, if organized, withhold supply and elim-
inate the independent distributors from their marketing functions. That this
threat is more actual than potential is evidenced by the existence of such
powerful organizations as the Land 0' Lakes Cooperative and the Dairy-
men's League in the distributive field.92
A third threat is the existence of chain grocery stores. The sale of milk
in chain stores does not necessarily depend on the profitable spread between
cost and selling price. A chain organization can well afford to sell milk as
a loss-leader, because it is only a single item in the store's make-up, profit
being computed on the basis of total sales, and not necessarily on the basis
of individual items.93
The existence of potential competition. is summed up tersely by Professot
Spencer:
"The situation is complicated by the existence of certain types of
dealers that apparently can survive indefinitely, even though the spread
between fixed producer's prices and competitive resale prices is insuffi-
'BLACK, THE DAIRY INDUSTRY UNDER THE A.A.A. (1935) 83.
'Horack and Cohen, After the Nebbia Case: The Administration of Price Regulation
(1934) 8 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 219.
'Supra note 89, p. 56.
'For a list of cooperative associations, see HANNA, COOPERATIVE MARKETING AsSOCIA-
TIONS (1931) 11-15. See also Nev York Times, Jan. 11, 1938, p. 25, col. 6, for an ac-
count of the creation of a "consumer-farmer cooperative".
'Spencer, The Future of Milk Control. Address at Farm and Home Week, Neew York
State College of Agriculture, Ithaca, N. Y., February 17, 1935.
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cient to sustain other very efficient dealers. For example, chain stores
are affected only slightly by the spread on milk and cream, because
these items constitute only a small proportion of their business. There
are other milk dealers who derive a large share of their income from
ice cream, or from sales outside the territory affected by the license.
In some markets, too, large milk distribution enterprises are operated
by farmers' cooperative associations. It has been the policy of such
associations to return to their members the net proceeds of sales after
deducting the expenses of operation. If this policy is continued, the
cooperatives are not placed on an equal footing with distributors who are
subject to fixed purchase prices under the licenses. '94
However, the threat of competition from chain stores, small distributors
and cooperatives is more an argument on the legal plane of discourse than
on the economic. The competitive element presented by chain stores is some-
what tempered by the fact that the large distributors offer a different servsce,
i.e., delivery, the demand for which is not necessarily abolished by the
existence of lower chain-store prices. Furthermore, as to the threat of com-
petition from small distributors, the threat is also too readily overemphasized.
Granted the existence of the surplus market, the competition between the
large distributor and the small distributor has not been devastating. If the
small distributors lower the price of milk, the tendency is to shift the com-
petitive burden on to the producer, who is usually forced to bear it in the
form of lower prices. There is substantial evidence supporting the theory
that the large distributors have kept an adequate margin of profit, despite
the low prices which the producer receives for his product.9 5 Furthermore,
huge distributors can, with the advantages of large capital, soften the attacks
of the small distributor's lower prices, by advertising the "superiority" of
their products,96 by stressing their superior sanitation equipment, and by
displaying more attractive delivery trucks to the public eye.
Perhaps the greatest threat comes from producer-distributor cooperatives.
In those markets in which they exist, their competition with the distributors
will become quite marked. But most of the milk markets have not yet been
penetrated by these cooperatives. Until they do penetrate the market, domi-
nance on the part of the large distributors still remains a probability.
VI
The Supreme Court has gone quite far in sanctioning open, conscious
agreements in a field in which there was no danger of "monopoly". Such
"Supra note 93.
"Supra notes 46, 47, 48, 72 and 73.
'This was recognized by the Supreme Court in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten
Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 56 Sup. Ct. 453 (1936). See also CHABEanLxN, MoNopoLisTIC
CoMPETrrION (1936), ch. IV, "The Differentiation of the Product: Monopolistic Com-
petition".
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
was the Appalachian Coal situation.97 It has gone far in sanctioning, within
certain limits, such open price structures as in the Sugar Institute case,98 in
which danger of "monopoly" was even more apparent.99 It has even upheld a
combination in which potential competition was virtually impossible.100 A
fortiori, a situation in which there are no open agreements to control selling
price, and in which the field is competitive, though dominated by a few,
would be beyond the pale of our existing anti-trust laws.
If one agrees with Mr. Justice Brandeis that "the essence of restraint is
power", and that "power may arise merely out of position", 1 it becomes
necessary for those suggesting reform of our outmoded legal tools to re-
appraise the meaning of "monopoly" and "restraint of trade". Only by
realizing that modern business has developed new techniques to reach an
old goal may one appreciate that the revaluation must not be in terms of
"the philosophical problem of the state of mind at the time", 0 2 but in terms
of cold, market economics.
'288 U. S. 344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933).
"297 U. S. 553, 56 Sup. Ct. 629 (1936).
"Fly, Observation on the Anti-Trust Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute
Decisions (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1339.
'United States v. United States Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473
(1918).
"Dissent in American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42
Sup. Ct. 114 (1921).
u'ARNoLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPIITALxSM (1937) 227.
